Ebook The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 16601783 Dover Military History Weapons Armor A T Mahan 9780486255095 Books
Ebook The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 16601783 Dover Military History Weapons Armor A T Mahan 9780486255095 Books
Download As PDF : The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 16601783 Dover Military History Weapons Armor A T Mahan 9780486255095 Books
First published almost a century ago, this classic text on the history and tactics of naval warfare had a profound effect on the imperial policies of all the major powers. Kaiser Wilhelm is said to have "devoured" this book, and it was avidly read by presidents (including both Roosevelts), kings, prime ministers, admirals, and chancellors.
This book was the work of noted U.S. naval officer and historian Alfred Mahan (1840–1914), who argued that despite great changes and scientific advances in naval weaponry, certain principle of naval strategy remain constant, and nations ignore them at their peril. Credited with stimulating the growth of modern navies in leading countries of the world, the text remains a basic authority on the strategy of naval warfare and is still used in the war colleges.
Demonstrating through historical examples that the rise and fall of seapower (and of nations) has always been linked with commercial and military command of the seas, Mahan describes successful naval strategies employed in the past — from Greek and Roman times through the Napoleonic wars. Focusing primarily on England's rise as a sea power in the 18th century, the book provides not only an overview of naval tactics, but a lucid exposition of geographical, economic, and social factors governing the maintenance of sea power.
The work is carefully written and exceptionally well-documented; moreover, the author's clear, well-thought-out text avoids technical language, making it accessible to a nonprofessional audience. In addition, four maps and a profusion of plans of naval battles help the reader grasp the strategy and tactics involved in some of the history's greatest maritime conflicts. In this inexpensive edition, the book represents an indispensable sourcebook for statesmen, diplomats, strategists, and naval commanders as well as students of history and international affairs. Although ships, weapons, and the global balance of power have altered greatly since 1890, the lessons taught here so vividly and compellingly are still applicable today. Includes 4 maps, 24 battle plans.
This book was the work of noted U.S. naval officer and historian Alfred Mahan (1840–1914), who argued that despite great changes and scientific advances in naval weaponry, certain principle of naval strategy remain constant, and nations ignore them at their peril. Credited with stimulating the growth of modern navies in leading countries of the world, the text remains a basic authority on the strategy of naval warfare and is still used in the war colleges.
Demonstrating through historical examples that the rise and fall of seapower (and of nations) has always been linked with commercial and military command of the seas, Mahan describes successful naval strategies employed in the past — from Greek and Roman times through the Napoleonic wars. Focusing primarily on England's rise as a sea power in the 18th century, the book provides not only an overview of naval tactics, but a lucid exposition of geographical, economic, and social factors governing the maintenance of sea power.
The work is carefully written and exceptionally well-documented; moreover, the author's clear, well-thought-out text avoids technical language, making it accessible to a nonprofessional audience. In addition, four maps and a profusion of plans of naval battles help the reader grasp the strategy and tactics involved in some of the history's greatest maritime conflicts. In this inexpensive edition, the book represents an indispensable sourcebook for statesmen, diplomats, strategists, and naval commanders as well as students of history and international affairs. Although ships, weapons, and the global balance of power have altered greatly since 1890, the lessons taught here so vividly and compellingly are still applicable today. Includes 4 maps, 24 battle plans.
Ebook The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 16601783 Dover Military History Weapons Armor A T Mahan 9780486255095 Books
"It can be argued that Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (At the time of original publication Mahan was a Captain) the Influence of Sea Power upon History was and perhaps remains, the single most influential book ever written by an American. It was written for the purpose of changing American attitudes towards modernizing its Navy. Via President Theodore Roosevelt it did just that. But it also influenced German Kaiser William II who began building a modern Imperial Navy for the purpose of upsetting England’s long standing as the preeminent sea power. This in turn launched both a navel construction war with Germany and fed British and European suspicions about German intentions. This along with Germany’s arrogant diplomacy fed a more general arms buildup and shifts in regional alliances that would be a major cause of World War I. One book equals one world war is a lot to put on one author but this is an actual speculation by historian Barbara Tuchman.
I had been delaying the day when I would make a point of reading this seminal book. Having done so, I wonder if this is the right one. In the usually recap of Mahan famous book the major points in The Influence are that:
1. Mahan argues a point I think originally made by Napoleon; that control of the sea gives to possessor the advantage in their the ability to strike at times and places where an opponent is least able to defend from such an attack.
2. A single major victory can determine who wins control of the sea and there by significantly increases their ability to win a larger war. So important is this aspect of the theory that well into World War II the Japanese Imperial Navy was still seeking to draw the US Navy into what it hoped would be a single, large naval battle, the outcome would decide WWII and be fought along the theoretical lines of Mahan.
In The Influence, Point I is far more nuanced. Sea Control can be expressed in terms of control of what I was taught to call sea lines of communication. That is a mid ocean line of ships that can intercept the enemy’s fleet and defeat it before it can achieve its mission.
Or control can be close in shore in the forms
Or Commercial blockade
Or Commerce warfare
Or Direct engagement with critical enemy land based holdings (Islands, harbors, land lines of communications) via embarked invasion troops.
And further limited to no more than local or seasonal controls of waterways that may or may not be critical to the larger strategic considerations.
Mahan has much more to say on this point ranging from the fact that a land power or continental power may have little need for open sea lines of communications and a prospective sea power may be limited by the number and types of harbors that grant it access to the sea or an enemies ability to exploit sea to shore power projections. Mahan would also remind his contemporary readers of logistical issues such as coal fired ships also depend on their own supply chain in the form or more or less vulnerable coaling stations.
Given that much of this book speaks of the problems nations can have with access to the sea, he notices that at one point the French Fleet was split between two harbors across the Bay of Biscay. The fleet was split between these harbors, but they parts could not provide mutual support. The winds that might allow one squadron to sortie, would keep the other unable to get out of the harbor.
What struck me as the most important lesson from the examples Mahan uses is that Naval strategy is an extension of National strategy and though doctrine, tactics follow. Students of the 17th and 18th century actions between the French and English tend to conclude that the French were generally bad at naval warfare. Mahan makes it clear that their leadership was often as brave and competent as their English counterparts. So often were the French ships better in design that captured French ship were highly desirable additions to the English Fleet.
Beyond the issue of individual fighting spirit, Mahan documents that:
As a continental power France had less need to be a major Naval Power.
French Colonies varied in their strategic importance
The national doctrine emphasized preservation of a fleet to maintain a threat against the British (The Fleet in being strategy) rather than risking the loss of expensive military assets in the chance of gaining what was most likely to be an indifferent result.
As for point 2. No where do I see Mahan speaking of a single engagement achieving more than a temporary or local advantage. Nations large enough to compete for command at sea were and are likely to have multiple squadrons such that a single fleet action by itself is unlikely tobe a war wining event.
Indeed the two cases most often cites as Mahan type victories are the American victory over the Spanish Navy , in fact two separate victories, one off Santiago, Cuba and the other in Manila Bay The Philippines. And the Japanese Victory over the Russians. Actually at least two major battles (Battle of Tsushima Strait and Battle of the Sea of Japan) and a series of skirmishes mostly in and about Port Author. Rarely mentioned was the battle of Lissa between Austria and Italy in 1866.
While all resulted in one sided victories all the losers had in common related to failures in technical parity, for example the US navy was modern, the Spanish was not, and tactical incompetence. Russia, a massive land power, could have traded soldiers for time until Japan won itself into bankruptcy. Battle involves chance and there are also outcomes that are not one-sided. Meantime, Cuba had to be taken by land action, The Philippines would become a stain on America’s honor and Lissa had zero direct effect on the war between its contenders.
Maybe this was not the particular book by Mahan that the usual historical sources are quoting. Mahan’s influence is not as hard to read as was common in formal texts of his period. He has numerous other titles, some write for the purpose or reaching a more general audience. Maybe the one title is meant to stand for the sum of his work.
My recommendation is that The Influence of Sea Power Upon History is worth consideration as a piece of history. It is not especially hard to read but likely to be impossible for someone looking for history as entertainment. I may turn to other Mahan titles, but for the moment I think I have read another one of those must reads. Minor point the maps on my Kindle were largely useless."
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Tags : The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Dover Military History, Weapons, Armor) [A. T. Mahan] on . <DIV>First published almost a century ago, this classic text on the history and tactics of naval warfare had a profound effect on the imperial policies of all the major powers. Kaiser Wilhelm is said to have devoured this book,A. T. Mahan,The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Dover Military History, Weapons, Armor),Dover Publications,0486255093,HIS027000,General,History, Modern - 20th century,History, Modern;20th century.,Naval history, Modern,Naval history, Modern.,Sea-power,Sea-power.,20th century,General Adult,HISTORY / Europe / Great Britain / General,HISTORY / General,HISTORY / Military / General,HISTORY / Modern / 17th Century,History,History - Military / War,History, Modern,History/Military - General,Maritime history,Military,Military - General,Modern - 17th Century,Non-Fiction,History American
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 16601783 Dover Military History Weapons Armor A T Mahan 9780486255095 Books Reviews :
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 16601783 Dover Military History Weapons Armor A T Mahan 9780486255095 Books Reviews
- Confession is supposed to be good for the soul. My confession is that I was aware of Mahan's seminal work on sea power for decades and included discussion of it in my history classes (FYI, I taught high school history for 13 years after 30 years in the Army.), but I had never read it.
The author clearly states the time period, 1660-1783, under study at the beginning. I would have preferred him to have started with the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English in 1588, especially since he gave so much attention to the Punic Wars.
Although written in in 1889, Mahan foreshadowed the territorial gains made during the Spanish-American War almost a decade later when he stated the need for stations in the Caribbean. However, stating that "Such colonies the U.S. has not and is not likely to have," he did not anticipate that we would retain the Philippines as a colony.
While recognizing this book focuses on sea power, I feel that Mahan should have given some details on what was happening on the ground. For example, he give no details on the capture of Quebec.
I was disappointed that there was no concluding chapter. The ending with the treaties signed at Versailles in 1783 seemed abrupt.
Mahan's work had a major influence on the shaping of nations' military force structure for decades. Teddy Roosevelt and Winston Churchill are two among many who embraced the concepts contained in the book. - I read this book primarily because of its great influence on decision makers and strategists when it was first published in 1890. A.T. Mahan has been described as one of the most influential authors of his time. Mahan was a career naval officer (Captain), Naval Academy graduate, and lecturer at the U.S. Naval War College.
The book is not and never was written for the general interest reader (like me). The reader must have an in-depth knowledge of European Wars (particularly naval actions) of the book's time frame. Additionally, the reader needs to intimately understand square-rigger sailing and fighting. The book is dense, repetitive, and its prose is not very good. Except for descriptions of naval engagements, which I found informative, I skimmed a good deal of the book. I'm also not sure all of Mahan's broad conclusions make sense. To be fair, though I have the benefit of hindsight.
I would only recommend this book to those highly interested in Mahan or his subject. One note the kindle version is free on . - It can be argued that Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (At the time of original publication Mahan was a Captain) the Influence of Sea Power upon History was and perhaps remains, the single most influential book ever written by an American. It was written for the purpose of changing American attitudes towards modernizing its Navy. Via President Theodore Roosevelt it did just that. But it also influenced German Kaiser William II who began building a modern Imperial Navy for the purpose of upsetting England’s long standing as the preeminent sea power. This in turn launched both a navel construction war with Germany and fed British and European suspicions about German intentions. This along with Germany’s arrogant diplomacy fed a more general arms buildup and shifts in regional alliances that would be a major cause of World War I. One book equals one world war is a lot to put on one author but this is an actual speculation by historian Barbara Tuchman.
I had been delaying the day when I would make a point of reading this seminal book. Having done so, I wonder if this is the right one. In the usually recap of Mahan famous book the major points in The Influence are that
1. Mahan argues a point I think originally made by Napoleon; that control of the sea gives to possessor the advantage in their the ability to strike at times and places where an opponent is least able to defend from such an attack.
2. A single major victory can determine who wins control of the sea and there by significantly increases their ability to win a larger war. So important is this aspect of the theory that well into World War II the Japanese Imperial Navy was still seeking to draw the US Navy into what it hoped would be a single, large naval battle, the outcome would decide WWII and be fought along the theoretical lines of Mahan.
In The Influence, Point I is far more nuanced. Sea Control can be expressed in terms of control of what I was taught to call sea lines of communication. That is a mid ocean line of ships that can intercept the enemy’s fleet and defeat it before it can achieve its mission.
Or control can be close in shore in the forms
Or Commercial blockade
Or Commerce warfare
Or Direct engagement with critical enemy land based holdings (Islands, harbors, land lines of communications) via embarked invasion troops.
And further limited to no more than local or seasonal controls of waterways that may or may not be critical to the larger strategic considerations.
Mahan has much more to say on this point ranging from the fact that a land power or continental power may have little need for open sea lines of communications and a prospective sea power may be limited by the number and types of harbors that grant it access to the sea or an enemies ability to exploit sea to shore power projections. Mahan would also remind his contemporary readers of logistical issues such as coal fired ships also depend on their own supply chain in the form or more or less vulnerable coaling stations.
Given that much of this book speaks of the problems nations can have with access to the sea, he notices that at one point the French Fleet was split between two harbors across the Bay of Biscay. The fleet was split between these harbors, but they parts could not provide mutual support. The winds that might allow one squadron to sortie, would keep the other unable to get out of the harbor.
What struck me as the most important lesson from the examples Mahan uses is that Naval strategy is an extension of National strategy and though doctrine, tactics follow. Students of the 17th and 18th century actions between the French and English tend to conclude that the French were generally bad at naval warfare. Mahan makes it clear that their leadership was often as brave and competent as their English counterparts. So often were the French ships better in design that captured French ship were highly desirable additions to the English Fleet.
Beyond the issue of individual fighting spirit, Mahan documents that
As a continental power France had less need to be a major Naval Power.
French Colonies varied in their strategic importance
The national doctrine emphasized preservation of a fleet to maintain a threat against the British (The Fleet in being strategy) rather than risking the loss of expensive military assets in the chance of gaining what was most likely to be an indifferent result.
As for point 2. No where do I see Mahan speaking of a single engagement achieving more than a temporary or local advantage. Nations large enough to compete for command at sea were and are likely to have multiple squadrons such that a single fleet action by itself is unlikely tobe a war wining event.
Indeed the two cases most often cites as Mahan type victories are the American victory over the Spanish Navy , in fact two separate victories, one off Santiago, Cuba and the other in Manila Bay The Philippines. And the Japanese Victory over the Russians. Actually at least two major battles (Battle of Tsushima Strait and Battle of the Sea of Japan) and a series of skirmishes mostly in and about Port Author. Rarely mentioned was the battle of Lissa between Austria and Italy in 1866.
While all resulted in one sided victories all the losers had in common related to failures in technical parity, for example the US navy was modern, the Spanish was not, and tactical incompetence. Russia, a massive land power, could have traded soldiers for time until Japan won itself into bankruptcy. Battle involves chance and there are also outcomes that are not one-sided. Meantime, Cuba had to be taken by land action, The Philippines would become a stain on America’s honor and Lissa had zero direct effect on the war between its contenders.
Maybe this was not the particular book by Mahan that the usual historical sources are quoting. Mahan’s influence is not as hard to read as was common in formal texts of his period. He has numerous other titles, some write for the purpose or reaching a more general audience. Maybe the one title is meant to stand for the sum of his work.
My recommendation is that The Influence of Sea Power Upon History is worth consideration as a piece of history. It is not especially hard to read but likely to be impossible for someone looking for history as entertainment. I may turn to other Mahan titles, but for the moment I think I have read another one of those must reads. Minor point the maps on my were largely useless.
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